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N 1914 the United States Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United States'
that evidence secured by federal officers in violation of the fourth amend-
ment could not be considered against persons prosecuted under federal law.'
Without such a rule, said the Court, the fourth amendment right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures "is of no value" for those so accused
and, as to them, "might as well be stricken from the Constitution."' In response
to the argument that exclusion of illegally seized but reliable evidence amount-
ed to suppression of the truth, the Court declared: "The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the funda-
mental law of the land."4 Although the Court could have required this exclu-
sionary rule in federal cases through the exercise of its supervisory authority
over the federal courts, the opinion in Weeks leaves little doubt that the Court
was establishing a constitutionally based rule. Thus, after Weeks, if the fourth
amendment provision against unreasonable searches and seizures were held to
be actually absorbed or incorporated through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and made applicable to the states, the exclusionary rule
would be carried along as a part of the "bag and baggage"' of that provision.
When the issue of application to the states was discussed by the Supreme
Court in the 1949 case of Wolf v. Colorado,' Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, refused to impose the exclusionary rule on the states. Frankfurter
did recognize that "[tihe security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society."7 He further conceded that there would be a violation of the fourteenth
amendment if a state were "affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into
privacy."' But Frankfurter rejected an outright incorporation of the fourth
* B.A., Birmingham-Southern College; M.A., J.D., Vanderbilt University. Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2Twenty-eight years earlier the Court had hinted at such a rule by way of dictum in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), but that case held only that the compulsory
production of a person's private books and papers for use in evidence against him compelled
him to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth amendment.
1232 U.S. at 393.41d.
' This descriptive phrase was employed by Justice Fortas in his concurring opinion in
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213 (1968). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
decided on the same day with Bloom, the sixth amendment right to jury trial was made
applicable to the states. The various opinions in Duncan and Bloom provide an excellent
study of the diverse positions that have been taken by members of the Supreme Court with
respect to the selective incorporation doctrine. This is the doctrine which has been used by
a majority of the Court during the past decade to make most of the criminal procedural
guarantees of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
'338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
'Id. at 28.
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amendment right and held that the due process clause did not require recog-
nition of the exclusionary rule as "an essential ingredient"" of the fourteenth
amendment right. In Wolf, then, the fourteenth amendment right against arbi-
trary police intrusion by the state and the fourth amendment right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures by federal officers remained distinctly separate,
and statements to the contrary in Mapp v. Ohio"0 seem clearly wrong."
The road from Wolf to Mapp was marked by signposts indicating that the
Supreme Court was becoming more and more convinced of the necessity for
excluding evidence in both state and federal courts as a means of deterring
illegal searches and seizures. The basic Weeks prohibition against the use in
federal cases of evidence illegally seized by federal officers was twice expanded.
In 1956 the Court authorized injunctive action: (a) to prohibit federal officers
from turning over their illegally seized evidence to state officials for use in a
state trial; and (b) to prohibit federal officers from testifying concerning such
evidence at the state trial." The second important development was the exclu-
sion in federal cases of evidence illegally seized by state officers but handed over
ton a silver platter" for use in federal prosecutions."
Finally, in 1961, the Court overruled Wolf and held that the exclusionary
rule must be applied in state cases. In rendering the landmark decision in Mapp,
a majority of the Supreme Court appeared to take it as settled that the fourth
amendment had been made applicable to the states by virtue of Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Wolf. Speaking for four members of the majority," Justice
Clark observed: "At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment
was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court, as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions."1 And elsewhere, stating the Court's holding, Clark repeated this
questionable reading of Wolf: "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy
has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government."1 It has been demon-
9 Id. at 29.10367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"See notes 15, 16 intra, and accompanying text.1 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). But cf. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S.
381 (1961).
1Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), rejected this so-called "silver platter"
doctrine.
14 Justice Black concurred, but only by concluding that the fourth and fifth amendments,
taken together, require the exclusionary rule. See 367 U.S. at 661-62, in which Black looks
to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as support for this theory. Justice Black,
of course, always contended that all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were made ap-
plicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Because Black's vote was necessary for
a majority in Mapp, it could be argued that the exclusionary rule in state search and seizure
cases is not really a fourth amendment requirement. See 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). However, the Court has certainly treated the rule as being required by the fourth
amendment alone. See especially the recent decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 499 (1971), in which Justice Black, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
remarked: "The Court today announces its new rules of police procedure in the name of
the Fourth Amendment, then holds that evidence seized in violation of the new 'guidelines'
is automatically inadmissible at trial. The majority does not purport to rely on the Fifth
Amendment to exclude the evidence in this case."




strated, however, that the right of privacy recognized in Wolf was strictly a
creature of the fourteenth amendment, separate and apart from the analogous
fourth amendment right. The presence of such a right "at the core" of the
fourth amendment certainly does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that a
similar fourteenth amendment right is identical in nature or scope. That Frank-
furter intended no incorporation of the fourth amendment by the fourteenth in
Wolf is made doubly clear by his joining Justice Harlan's dissent in Mapp, in
which Harlan reminded the Court:
It cannot be too much emphasized that what was recognized in Wolf was
not that the Fourth Amendment as such is enforceable against the States as a
facet of due process ... but the principle of privacy 'which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment. ... It would not be proper to expect or impose any pre-
cise equivalence, either as regards the scope of the right or the means of its im-
plementation, between the requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
17
There is no question, of course, that with Mapp the commands of the fourth
amendment became applicable to the states. It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that this was accomplished at least partly by use of the assumption-
questionable at best-that incorporation of the fourth amendment by the four-
teenth had in fact already been announced by the Court. As stated earlier, if
we are to assume that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states, then
the exclusionary rule would seem also clearly applicable, since in Weeks that
rule was stated to be a necessary ingredient of the amendment. This is precisely
what Justice Clark concluded in Mapp.
Concerning the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the plurality opinion in
Mapp placed some emphasis on the "imperative of judicial integrity, 18 but the
real reason for adoption of the rule was stated as follows: "the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaran-
ty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.' "19
II. Two QUESTIONABLE THESES
The Supreme Court's enchantment with the exclusionary rule in fourth
amendment cases has been largely dependent upon two hastily drawn conclu-
sions: (1) that the rule will act as a deterrent against illegal arrests, searches,
and seizures, and (2) that there are no other "effectively available" means of
enforcing the amendment. One of the objectionable features of both Weeks
and Mapp is that in neither case did the Court really inquire into the validity
of either of these two theses.
A. The Rule as a Deterrent
Judge Friendly has noted that the use of the word "deter" in describing the
purpose of the exclusionary rule "suggests" an analogy with the purpose of
"'Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting).18 Id. at 659, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).91d. at 656 (emphasis added), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217(1960).
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punishment in the criminal process." That purpose is often said to be twofold:
( 1) the direct deterrence of future criminal acts by the convicted offender, and
(2) a general deterrence of similar acts by others in the community who ob-
serve that punishment is imposed for commission of the particular offense."
Can this same theory be applied to the effect of the exclusionary rule on the
police? Will an individual policeman, observing that evidence secured by him
illegally has been excluded at trial, be deterred from similar illegal conduct in
the future? Will police in general be deterred from making unlawful arrests
and searches because of the exclusion of evidence that was improperly obtained
by other police officers?
An obvious flaw in the analogy is that a convicted offender is punished per-
sonally, while the exclusionary rule operates directly only against the prosecutor
who is thwarted in his attempt to have the evidence admitted but who rarely,
if ever, has any control over the persons responsible for the illegal conduct."'
Considered in a broader context, the prosecutor represents the people, who in
turn are obliged to accept less than the truth in the case and, therefore, are
also "punished" by the rule. Those left unpunished are the obviously guilty
defendant and the police officer who conducted the illegal search. Indeed, the
rule has often been criticized as providing protection only for the guilty." Of
course, as Professor LaFave has pointed out, if there is a deterrent effect, the
police will be restrained from engaging in illegal conduct that is directed at
innocent as well as guilty individuals. 4 On the other hand, once the illegal
invasion has been accomplished, it is the guilty who will profit by application
of the exclusionary rule-evidence that proves guilt or clearly tends to do so
must not be considered." As for the erring policeman, one might expect at
least a reprimand or other form of disciplinary action, if only as punishment
for damaging the state's case. It is more likely that general police response
will be disdain for the court's action and complete sympathy with the indi-
vidual policeman's position."
Another stumbling block to deterrence is that the police are often not so
much concerned with convictions as with arrests and case clearances. At the
time the search is conducted the trial is only a distant possibility; the imme-
diate goal is to apprehend the offender and secure the evidence which proves
"
0 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,
951 (1965).
" See Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 MODERN L. REV. 117 (1958).
"See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REV.
665, 726 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Con-
stitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815, 816 (1964).
' LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule--Part 1: Cur-
rent Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as LaFave].
2" There may be cases in which the accused is merely an innocent victim of circumstances,
but it is likely that in the great majority of cases the illegally seized evidence actually proves
the defendant's guilt.
20 In fact, the recent study by Professor Oaks "failed to reveal a single law enforcement
agency where individual sanctions are tied to an application of the exclusionary rule." Oaks
710. "IT]he officer was assured of the sympathy of his superiors so long as he acted 'in
conformity with administrative norms of police organization ..... Id. at 727.
[Vol. 25
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that he is the offender. This will result in "clearance" of the case." In many
instances there is never even any thought of seeking a prosecution. This is
particularly true in cases involving gambling, liquor, narcotics, and drug of-
fenses. The purpose of a search and seizure here may be harrassment of the
offenders or the removal of contraband items, such as narcotics, from circula-
tion. This type of police action has the desired effect of demonstrating to the
public that efforts are under way to control these criminal activities." The
exclusionary rule can obviously play no role whatsoever in these cases, nor in
instances in which the police are acting only to control a potentially danger-
ous situation,"' since no trial is even contemplated.
Finally, consider the numerous cases in which the police have simply made
an honest and understandable error in judgment. It is likely that a substantial
percentage of illegal police searches and seizures would fall within this cate-
gory. There has been no intentional undercutting of fourth amendment re-
quirements. To the police officer acting under the pressures of the moment
the search appeared to be entirely reasonable, and there was very little time
to ponder the question."0 The United States Supreme Court may consider the
case for months before making its decision, and even then is apt to be divided
in its determination of the issue. In fact, Supreme Court case law governing
arrests, search, and seizure has been badly blurred by shifting sands. This has
been especially true on the problem of the warrantless search incident to ar-
rest, a situation which involves most crucially the arresting officer's exercise
of discretion."' The difficulty in determining what is "reasonable" under the
2, LaFave illustrates the police thinking as follows:
Inasmuch as it is common police practice to measure efficiency in terms of the
number of arrests or 'clearances' made, any drop-off in arrests (even of the
unconvictable) would likely be viewed within the department as a sign of re-
trogression. Somehow a record of 100 arrests and 80 clearances but only 10
convictions outshines one of 30 arrests, 25 clearances, and 20 convictions.
This near obsession with the apprehension of the offender as an end in itself
also filters down to the lowest ranks, where the natural ardor of the chase
also takes hold.
LaFave 447.
2" See LaFave 429, 443-44. See also Oaks 721-22:
Informed observers have suggested a variety of goals or motivations other than
obtaining convictions that may prompt police arrest and search and seizure.
These include arrest or confiscation as a punitive sanction (common in
gambling and liquor law violations), arrest for the purpose of controlling
prostitutes and transvestites, arrest of an intoxicated person for his own safe-
ty, search for the purpose of recovering stolen property, arrest and search and
seizure for the purpose of 'keeping the lid on' in a high crime area or of
satisfying public outcry for visible enforcement, search for the purpose of re-
moving weapons or contraband such as narcotics from circulation, and search
for weapons that might be used against the searching officer. A large propor-
tion of police behavior is traceable to these reasons for arrest and search and
seizure and thus is not likely to be responsive to any deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.
"Note the reference to "keeping the lid on" in the statement quoted in note 28 supra.
See also Oaks 728: "The patrolman is oriented to approach incidents that threaten order
not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the situation.' "
"See, e.g., Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on
People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 590 (1955).
"'See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947). An interesting list of quotations reflecting the Court's seesaw ap-
proach to this problem may be found in Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake,
19 DEPAUL L. REv. 80, 98-100 (1969). See also Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search
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fourth amendment has been further aggravated by inconsistent decisions from
lower court judges, many of whom appear to look upon certain types of
offenses as more appropriate for application of the exclusionary rule than
others."1 There is also a dismal failure by trial judges to explain their rulings
satisfactorily. Professor LaFave describes a typical hearing on a motion to
suppress as follows:
As the hearing on the motion progresses, it is not uncommon for there never
to be a clear statement by any party or by the judge himself of precisely what
aspect of the officer's actions lies at the heart of the controversy. When the
judge ultimately either grants or denies the defense motion to suppress, it is
unlikely that he will give any explanation. Any elaboration on the ruling is di-
rected toward counsel, and no effort is made to enlighten the officer on the
matter.3
As LaFave has emphasized, if a rule of conduct cannot be made clear to the
person who must follow it, any deterrent effect it may otherwise have had is
likely to be neutralized entirely. "
It is probably impossible to reach a truly reliable empirical determination
concerning the success of the exclusionary rule in deterring illegal searches
and seizures. However, the most recent attempt, by Professor Dallin H. Oaks
of the University of Chicago Law School, yielded findings of which the follow-
ing is a sample. (1) In Chicago in 1969 motions to suppress evidence were
"the dispositive event" in forty-five percent of the gambling cases and in
thirty-three percent of the narcotics cases.' These rates "seem considerably
higher than would be necessary if the Chicago police were really serious about
observing the search and seizure rules."' (2) Police officers have long felt
that their duty to recover stolen property overrides adherence to fourth
amendment requirements. The study failed to show any correlation between
adoption of the exclusionary rule and a decrease in recovery of stolen proper-
ty. ' This indicates that the exclusionary rule probably does not induce greater
conformity with Fourth Amendment rules. (3) The police do not look upon
the exclusionary rule as a protective device for the citizenry, but see it as a
"hindrance" in fighting crime and are willing to manufacture probable cause
or violate the rules governing search and seizure when they feel it is impor-
tant to do so in solving crime. 8 In this regard, the police tend to "rely on
departmental rather than legal norms of behavior.""
for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Warrantless Search, 45 CONN. B.J. 2 (1971).
The Court has also been indecisive and its opinions confusing on the problem of war-
rantless automobile searches. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
" "In some communities many trial judges display a higher degree of leniency in what
they characterize as 'minor gambling cases' than they do in most other cases." LaFave 429.
See also id. at 404-05.
MId. at 403.
' Id. at 396. See also LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role
in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1003 (1965).
I" Oaks 684-85.
36 Id. at 685-86.
I d. at 692-93.
38Id. at 700-01 (summarizing the conclusions of J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1967)).39Id. at 701.
[Vol. 25
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Despite the gathering of "the largest fund of information yet assembled
on the effect of the exclusionary rule," Professor Oaks was compelled to con-
clude that the information was insufficient either to sustain or refute the de-
terrence theory.0 However, his own personal conclusions were more decisive:
As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by the police,
the exclusionary rule is a failure. There is no reason to expect the rule to have
any direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not
meant to result in prosecutions, and there is hardly any evidence that the rule
exerts any deterrent effect on the small fraction of law enforcement activity
that is aimed at prosecution.4'
B. Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule
While it is probably true that there is no presently effective means of en-
forcing the fourth amendment, there are enforcement tools available which
could be made effective. In truth, adoption of the exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases may have impeded development and refinement of far better
alternatives." Let us examine some of the most likely possibilities.
Civil Action for Damages Against Policeman. Dissenting in Wolf v. Colo-
rado," Justice Murphy presented persuasive arguments against reliance on the
availability of a tort action for damages as a deterrent to fourth amendment
violations." In most cases there will be either little or no direct injury to
person or property as the result of an unlawful search. This may give a com-
plainant pause in bringing suit at all,' particularly if the search uncovered
incriminating evidence against him. Even if the action is brought, and the
fourth amendment violation is proved, it is likely that no more than nominal
damages will be awarded." Punitive damages may be available, but as Justice
Murphy indicated "the plaintiff must show the real ill will or malice of the
defendant,"4 and this will be extremely difficult in most cases, especially in
view of the average juror's sympathetic response to vigorous law enforce-
40 Id. at 709.
" ld. at 755.
'See id. at 753.
43338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Id. at 41-47 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
'It has also been suggested that some individuals will be deterred from bringing suit
by fear of police reprisals. See Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism-A Note
on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. REv. 407, 430 (1961), citing Comment, Philadelphia
Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1952).
4 In addition to Murphy's Wolf dissent, 338 U.S. at 41, see Barrett, supra note 30, at
568; Oaks 673; Sloane & Leedes, A Mapp for the Road Towards Exclusion, 35 TEMP. L.Q.
27, 37 (1961); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its De-
velopment and Application, 35 SO. CAL. L. REV. 64, 74 (1961). It is interesting to note,
however, that in Canada "the remedy in tort has proved reasonably effective; Canadian juries
are quick to resent illegal activity on the part of the police and to express that resentment
by a proportionate judgment for damages." Martin, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign
Law, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 271, 272 (1961). The exclusionary rule has not been followed
in search and seizure cases in Canada. Id. at 271-72. In fact, it is "unique to American juris-
prudence" as applied in search cases. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949), (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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ment." Finally, even if there is recovery, collection will be difficult. A police-
man's lot is not a wealthy one."9
It should be noted that a federal cause of action for damages is available
against state and local officials by statute,"0 and the Supreme Court has re-
cently approved a new federal "cause of action under the Fourth Amendment"
against federal officials whose fourth amendment violations result in injury
to another."' Overall, despite the inherent limitations discussed above, it is
quite possible that the threat of civil liability serves as a deterrent to illegal
police conduct in more situations than does the exclusionary rule.
Penal Sanctions. Factors similar to those discussed in connection with the tort
remedy make criminal proceedings against policemen an even more unlikely
tool for enforcing compliance with the fourth amendment. District attorneys
are naturally going to be hesitant to prosecute a policeman in connection with
law enforcement activities, and juries are probably inclined to accord the po-
liceman that crucial reasonable doubt.2 In this regard, an honest and reason-
able belief by the policeman that the action in question was lawful under
the circumstances should be a good defense. It would be unthinkable to impose
penal sanctions without requiring that the prosecutor prove malice, intent,
recklessness, or at least a substantial deviation from reasonable police conduct. 3
In fact, perhaps neither criminal liability nor personal financial liability should
be imposed without a showing of willfulness or actions that were "clearly
beyond the limits of authority or 'jurisdiction.' ,5
Disciplinary Action. Administrative disciplinary action against the individual
policeman who violates the fourth amendment is more appropriate in most
cases than any other available enforcement measure. Such action could be in
the form of interdepartmental discipline after a police review of the alleged
violation, or it could be as a result of an independent evaluation of the facts
by a civilian review board. Because of the obvious difficulty in obtaining ob-
4' In his Wolf dissent Justice Murphy went on to point out various additional limitations
on recovery in some jurisdictions:
[R]ecovery may yet be defeated by the rule that there must be physical dam-
ages before punitive damages may be awarded. In addition, some states limit
punitive damages to the actual expenses of litigation. . . . Others demand
some arbitrary ratio between actual and punitive damages before a verdict
may stand. . . . Even assuming the ill will of the officer, his reasonable
grounds for belief that the home he searched harbored evidence of crime
is admissible in mitigation of punitive damages. . . . The bad reputation of
the plaintiff is likewise admissible.
Id. at 43.
"'The problem of collection is frequently cited as a major obstacle to effectiveness of
the tort remedy as a protector of fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Amsterdam, The Su-
preme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785, 787
(1970); Barrett, supra note 30, at 568; Morris, supra note 45, at 429; Oaks 673.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), as applied in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
91Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
" See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L.
REV. 621 (1955), relied on in Oaks 673.
" Existing statutes imposing criminal liability will generally require malice or willfulness.
See Edwards, supra note 52, at 624.
"Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity For Police Officers In
Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889, 907 (1965).
(Vol. 2 5
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jectivity by a police review board, the civilian review alternative seems highly
preferable.'
There are a number of advantages to administrative discipline as a means
of deterring illegal police conduct. It is pointedly directed at the individual
offender, and the reasons for any punitive measures taken would undoubtedly
be explained to the policeman." Disciplinary measures could be more carefully
tailored to the circumstances in each case with particular attention given to
the police officer's culpability. Thus, no action or only an administrative repri-
mand might be appropriate in many cases, while forfeiture of pay, suspension
for a specified period, or expulsion from the police force could be imposed
for more serious violations. Finally, it is certain that civilian review boards
would not feel the same reluctance as juries in punishing a police officer in
a proper case. Neither, however, is such a board likely to go to the opposite
extreme and recommend or impose unwarranted disciplinary measures. Such
an objection to the civilian review system has been found unsupported in
actual practice. 7
To those who dismiss the possibility of establishing a civilian review pro-
gram that would be supported by the general public, it is submitted that
there might be more ready acceptance of the plan if the public were made
sufficiently aware of the operation and effect of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule, and if creation of the civilian review board were coupled
with or preceded by abolition of that rule. In addition, the composition, pro-
cedures, and powers of the board must be very carefully formulated, and the
public should be fully informed concerning the board's functions and authori-
ty. s
A New Civil Action Against the Government. An action against the police
officer's employer under the principle of respondeat superior would assure an
injured party adequate compensation and would be perfectly proper in view
of the public's stake in vigorous but proper law enforcement. The idea is by
far the most effective compensatory device yet designed to put teeth into the
promises of the fourth amendment. Some of its proponents see it as providing
a deterrent effect as well, reasoning that "[aifter not very many outlays of
public funds the taxpayers and administrative heads would insist upon curbing
" Most law enforcement agencies probably have some type of internal procedure for
handling complaints. See Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints
Against the Police, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 448, 454 (1970). See also Oaks 674; Comment,
Lawless Law Enforcement, 4 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 161, 163 (1971), in which the author re-
marks: "When police 'police' themselves, complaints are either ignored or, more often,
an impossible burden of proof is placed on the complainant."
5See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (1964).
5 See statistics in Barton, supra note 55, at 460, where, in discussing the Philadelphia
Police Advisory Board (which was dissolved in December 1969), the author notes:
In the eight-year period up to 1966, out of 627 complaints, 400 were in-
formally settled or dropped. Approximately 150 complainants had hearings,
and recommendations adverse to an officer occurred in only 44 cases, normally
as a result of incidents classed as 'brutality.' These recommendations were:
dismissals, 2; suspension (up to 30 days), 23; reprimand, 19.
"Chief Justice Burger has suggested specific guidelines for a civilian review board in
Burger, supra note 56, at 17-19.
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unlawful police action."' 9 The proposal has been endorsed by a number of
writers and judges,"0 including most recently the Chief Justice of the United
States, who has suggested the following specific guidelines for proposed legis-
lation:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforce-
ment officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person
aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or statutes regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned
after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the
statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evi-
dence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
and
(e) provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be ex-
cluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth
Amendment."'
Under Burger's proposal the need for an authoritative formulation of fourth
amendment standards would be met by providing "appellate judicial review
... on much the same basis that it is now provided as to district courts and
regulatory agencies.""
There are two needs in connection with enforcement of the fourth amend-
ment. One is the deterrence of police violations; the other is compensation for
those whose fourth amendment rights have been infringed and who have
suffered some injury. It is submitted that a combination of the civilian review
board and the proposed new civil proceeding against the government would
provide the most effective framework for meeting these two needs. The police-
man would be deterred by a real prospect of disciplinary action, and the victim
of illegal activities would be in a much more favorable position for recovery
of adequate damages. Significantly, unlike the exclusionary rule, both pro-
cedures would provide a forum for consideration of cases involving innocent
victims of police misconduct when no criminal proceedings result.
III. ACCEPTING THE WEEKS/MAPP SUPPOSITIONS
Even if the two theses discussed above are accepted as valid, imposition of
the exclusionary rule as a constitutional requirement in search and seizure
cases is still extremely difficult to justify. It is an inflexible rule requiring
judicial suppression of reliable evidence regardless of the gravity of the police
illegality and with dubious constitutional authority.
" Report of California State Bar Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, 29 CAL.
ST. B.J. 263, 264 (1954), cited in Barrett, supra note 30, at 594.
00 In addition to the sources cited in note 59 supra, see McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule:
An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 266, 268 (1961); Plumb,
Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 387 (1939); Oaks 717-18; Taft,
supra note 23, at 817.
01 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).69Id. at 423.
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A. Suppressing the Truth
The most troublesome aspect of the rule is its direct suppression of the
truth. In this connection, application of the rule in cases involving illegally
obtained confessions should be contrasted." The rule's operation there can be
supported on the ground that confessions are inherently suspect, and, when
the confession has been obtained illegally, the courts are justified in treating
it as unreliable evidence. Of course, the unreliability rationale has not been
the primary basis for the Supreme Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule
in the confession cases," but it does provide significant support for the rule
in those cases. This is also true of the exclusion of courtroom identifications
which have been shown to be dependent upon a pretrial confrontation between
the witness and the accused conducted in an unnecessarily suggestive manner"
or without according the accused his sixth amendment right to counsel.* Again,
the rule may be considered appropriate to assure the exclusion of evidence-
i.e., identification testimony-reasonably believed to be unreliable." With il-
legally seized evidence, however, the only possible issues of reliability are:
(a) whether the evidence was in fact found in the place alleged, and (b)
if so, to what extent does it connect the defendant to the offense. The legality
or illegality of the search has no bearing on these issues and, thus, can in no
way affect the determination of whether the offered items constitute reliable
evidence of guilt.' In most cases the evidence is actual proof of guilt, and
"[tihe criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.""
The discharge of obviously guilty persons is the most serious and direct
result of the exclusionary rule, but there are also unfortunate side effects. One
is that many criminal trials will suffer unnecessary and distracting delay while
arguments are made on the motion to suppress evidence and the judge pon-
ders his decision on this complex and crucial issue. The focus of the proceed-
ings shifts abruptly from the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant
to the question of the legality of police activities."0 This, of course, is not the
"See Oaks 666.
"See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959), in which the Court stated:
"The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their
inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must
obey the law while enforcing the law . And in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
541 (1961), the Court pointed out:
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascer-
tamined extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of
excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this considera-
tion. Indeed, in many . . . cases . . . independent corroborating evidence left
little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such
verification, confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally
impermissible methods in their inducement.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-60 (1966), for a discussion of the "com-
plex of values" underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.
" See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
"United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
" See Oaks 666.
"See Cohn, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-Israel, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 282, 283 (1961); Taft, supra note 23, at 816; Comment, The Exclusionary Rule of
Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and Application, 35 SO. CAL. L. REV. 64, 65
(1961).
69 This is Cardozo's famous statement on the effect of the exclusionary rule in People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
"
0See, e.g., Oaks 742.
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purpose of a criminal trial. One critic of the rule has properly reminded us
that not only is the determination of guilt or innocence of the defendant the
"most important function" of the criminal trial, "it is its only function." To
allow the criminal proceedings to be transformed into a court of inquiry con-
cerning the alleged police illegality is nothing less than evasion by the courts
of their responsibility in the case."2
Another disturbing outgrowth of these cases is a loss of public confidence
in our system of justice. Ironically, a strong argument against admissibility of
illegally seized evidence has been that it allows the government to profit by
its own lawbreaking and, thus, "breeds contempt for law."' Indeed, the pub-
lic's confidence in its police force may be undermined by repeated showings
of police misconduct. But respect for and confidence in our judicial system
would seem to be much more dangerously threatened by the continued re-
fusal of the courts to consider perfectly reliable evidence that proves the
guilt of the accused.' To set the defendant free as a result of the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence is certain to be looked upon as acquittal on a "tech-
nicality," a complaint that is heard so frequently from the general public.
Another method of controlling police behavior--even one that has heretofore
been unfavorably regarded by a large segment of the community7 -would
undoubtedly be more acceptable to the public than this truth suppression
device.
B. An Inflexible Sanction
The exclusionary rule in search cases not only compels suppression of the
truth, but does so indiscriminately, without regard for degrees of police illegal-
ity. Consider case one: A police officer has an unfounded suspicion that X
committed a certain robbery. He breaks and enters X's house without a war-
rant, causes considerable damage to the premises during a general ransacking
of the place, and finally succeeds in uncovering items which had been taken
during the robbery in question. This leads to an arrest of X on the robbery
charge. Compare case two: Two police officers, without a warrant, but having
probable cause to believe that Y has committed a robbery, go to Y's house
and arrest him on the front porch. Not wanting to risk removal of evidence
from the house by a member of Y's family or a confederate, one of the offi-
cers enters the house and looks summarily through several rooms, discovering
stolen items in an upstairs bedroom.
The searches in both of the above cases are illegal under the fourth amend-
ment as currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The search
71 McGarr, supra note 60, at 267. McGarr then quotes Wigmore, protesting that the rule
"puts Supreme Courts in the position of assisting to undermine the foundations of the very
institutions they are set there to protect." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 2184, at 36 (1940).
See also Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479(1922).
72 "[Clriminal courts exist for the protection of society, and they fail this purpose, this
duty, if they release a prisoner in the face of evidence of his guilt because another has failed
the same duty." Plumb, supra note 60, at 378.73 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
' See Plumb, supra note 60, at 378.




in case one is patently objectionable. In case two there is probable cause for
the arrest, and the prosecutor may argue that the search is incident to a law-
ful arrest and, thus, covered by an exception to the requirement for a search
warrant. However, the Supreme Court presently requires that a search incident
to arrest must be limited to the area within the arrested person's immediate
control."8 The interior of the house here is clearly not within Y's immediate
control, yet the illegality of this search obviously cannot compare with the
gross violation of fourth amendment rules in the first case. Nevertheless, the
result in each case will be exclusion of the evidence seized. Chief Justice
Burger has referred to this inflexibility as "universal 'capital punishment'" for
illegally obtained evidence and has likened it to "a police order authorizing
'shoot-to-kill' with respect to every fugitive."'
The exclusionary rule in its fourth amendment application is far too abso-
lute in scope. There is no way to modify the harsh effect of the rule in appro-
priate cases. As Barrett has said: "there will always be a substantial number
of cases in which the defendant will go free, however clear his guilt may be,
and however much more serious his crime may be than the policeman's error.""
Honest errors of judgment are treated as harshly as willful and malicious
misconduct, and this alone makes the rule unreasonable in a large proportion
of the cases to which it is applied.
C. Constitutional Basis
In view of the serious objections to exclusion of reliable but illegally seized
evidence, it might be expected that a clear constitutional mandate could be
shown in support of the requirement. The fourth amendment prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures and requires that warrants be issued only
upon a showing of probable cause, but there is no statement concerning en-
forcement of these guarantees.' It is certainly reasonable to assume that had
the fourth amendment been designed to require exclusion of evidence seized
in violation of its provisions, it would have been drafted so as to make this
purpose explicit. There is no question that the Supreme Court could impose
the requirement in federal cases in the exercise of its supervisory authority
over the federal court system. In addition, Congress might see fit to establish
the rule as an implementing device; and it probably could do so even for
state criminal proceedings, since it is expressly given the authority to enact
"appropriate legislation" for the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment's
command of due process." However, there is much to be said for the position
that the Supreme Court has overstepped its authority by writing into the fourth
amendment a constitutional requirement that is simply not there.!' This is
not to advocate such a restrictive approach as to prevent the Court from inter-
1"See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
77 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78 Barrett, supra note 30, at 591.
79 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. And see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
"See Black's discussion in his opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
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preting the Constitution in light of present-day realities, for there is a signifi-
cant difference between a liberal interpretation of constitutional language and
the outright addition of language to the constitution.
It has been contended that the fourth and fifth amendments together re-
quire the exclusionary rule. 2 Under the fifth amendment, however, as Justice
Holmes once noted, "(a] party is privileged from producing the evidence,
but not from its production."' Even Justice Black, who was the chief pro-
ponent of the overlapping amendments theory,"' appeared to restrict the appli-
cation of this doctrine to those instances in which the defendant was compelled
to participate in some way in producing the evidence in question."
The structure housing the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases is
built upon a shaky constitutional foundation. This fact would make abandon-
ment of the rule a much easier step for the United States Supreme Court.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Oaks Study"
Publication of an important new empirical study on the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule, with findings that reinforce the doubts already surrounding
the rule, is in itself a highly significant development. Professor Oaks' study
has been cited by the Chief Justice of the United States as showing the failure
of the exclusionary rule to deter illegal searches.' The study's conclusion that,
at best, there is no evidence that the exclusionary rule deters," and Professor
Oaks' own opinion that it has been "a failure in that vital task,"'9 probably
assures widespread reconsideration of the rule in the law journals and, in fact,
may already have influenced some of the other important new activity in this
area.
B. American Law Institute
In the latest draft of its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure," the
496 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661
(1961) (Black, J., concurring).
82See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
"Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
"The suggestion had been made as early as 1886 in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). See note 2 supra.
"See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971) (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting); notes 112-16 infra, and accompanying text. Black would have relied ex-
clusively upon the fifth amendment for suppression of evidence in any case. 403 U.S. at
498. A majority of the Supreme Court has often stated that the fifth amendment is appli-
cable only where the accused is compelled to produce "testimonial" evidence. See, e.g.,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (requiring handwriting sample did not violate
the privilege); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requirement to appear in
lineup and to speak words solely for voice identification did not violate privilege against
self-incrimination); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking blood sample
from accused without his consent did not violate the privilege). It is interesting to note
that Justice Black dissented from each of these rulings, 388 U.S. at 277, 388 U.S. at 243,
and 384 U.S. at 773, respectively.
" See the discussion of the Oaks study at notes 35-41 supra, and accompanying text.
"7 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88 See note 40 supra, and accompanying text.
"Oaks 755.




highly respected American Law Institute, citing the Oaks study, voiced con-
cern with the practice of excluding all illegally seized evidence and empha-
sized that it was "not, as a matter of policy, wedded to the exclusionary rule
as the sole or best means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment."'" In its section
on motions to suppress evidence the Institute adopted language that calls for
a balancing approach to the question: "Unless otherwise required by the Con-
stitution of the United States or of this State, a motion to suppress evidence
based upon a violation of any of the provisions of this code shall be granted
only if the court finds that such violation was substantial..' Although in de-
bates on this section one member wondered whether it was necessary for a
model code to restate existing constitutional rules if such rules reflect an in-
correct interpretation of the Constitution," a majority felt that the proposal
,'must be concerned with what is constitutionally possible in the present state
of the law."'4 This accounts for the provision requiring that the motion to
suppress be granted if "required by the Constitution of the United States.""
In the light of this language the proposal could be taken as recommending no
departure whatsoever from established practice. However, the thrust of the
section is obviously toward a weighing of interests, and in the commentary
it is suggested that "the constitutional issue itself may be affected by the factor
of substantiality."" This factor, then, becomes the key feature of the proposal.
In determining whether a particular violation of the fourth amendment
has been "substantial" all circumstances are to be considered, but the follow-
ing factors are specifically listed in the model code provision:
(a) the importance of the particular interest violated;
(b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(c) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(d) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(e) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(f) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discover-
ed; and
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability
to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which
the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.'
With the exception of clause (g), concerning "the extent to which the viola-
tion has damaged the defendant's case,"'" all of these factors are clear in mean-
ing and, in general, are appropriate for consideration. However, the focal point
of a court's inquiry should depend upon the purpose for retaining the exclu-
sionary rule in this limited form. If the purpose is to deter illegal police con-
duct, the issue of primary concern should be whether the violation was de-
liberate, since a willful violation is far more likely to be deterred than an
honest error in judgment. This would be akin to the practice in Scotland,
" Id. S SS 8.02, Commentary.
92ld. § SS 8.02(2) (emphasis added).
'39 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2179 (June 2, 1971).
9ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 8.02, Commentary (Tent.
Draft No. 4, Apr. 30, 1971).
95"d.
96Id.
97Id. §5 SS 8.02(2) (a)-(g).
"Id. § SS 8.02, Commentary.
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in which the judge exercises discretion in determining whether to exclude
illegally seized evidence, and in which the chief question considered is "wheth-
er the departure from strict procedure has been adopted deliberately and by
way of trick."" Judge Friendly has suggested the same approach, believing
that the "aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be suffi-
ciently accomplished by a practice . . . outlawing evidence obtained by fla-
grant or deliberate violation of rights."'00 Taking this view, the model code
provision could have been worded to provide initially that no evidence is to
be excluded unless the court finds that exclusion will "tend to prevent viola-
tions," using the language of clause (e), above. In determining this the in-
quiry would be whether the "violation was willful," (clause (c)), giving due
consideration to "the extent of deviation from lawful conduct" (clause (b))
and "the extent to which privacy was invaded" (clause (d)). The finding of a
gross deviation from lawful conduct, for example, or a "shocking" invasion
of privacy would certainly tend to show willfulness on the part of the police
officer. The importance of the interest violated (clause (a)), and whether
or not the items would have been discovered anyway (clause (f)), have little
if any bearing on whether exclusion of evidentiary items will tend to deter
other violations.
That the deterrence factor has been listed independently in the model code
indicates that the drafters considered the purpose of their modified exclusionary
rule to be at least twofold, with deterrence playing perhaps only a secondary
role. The primary goal could be seen as that "imperative of judicial integ-
rity"''1 which the Supreme Court mentioned in the Mapp case. With this as
the paramount concern the framework of the proposal takes on more mean-
ing. Certainly the nature of the interest being protected becomes of consider-
able importance. And even the question of whether the evidence would other-
wise have been discovered becomes a legitimate point of inquiry, for if it
would have been discovered even without the illegal conduct, then admitting
it at the trial is not nearly so destructive of "judicial integrity." Weighing
these factors with the nature of the policeman's conduct provides an emi-
nently sound balancing approach as an alternative to the present inflexibility
of Supreme Court policy.
C. Rumblings from the High Court
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.10 In this recent case police officers arrested de-
fendant inside his home "for the commission of a particularly brutal mur-
der."' Immediately following the arrest the police exercised control over the
defendant's automobile, which was parked in the driveway to the house, and
"
0Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-England, 52 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 272, 274 (1961). See generally Gray, The Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Ob-
tained in Scotland, 1966 JURID. REV. 89, 100-01, 113, in which the author takes issue with
the Scottish cases, pointing out that another determining feature in those cases has been the
gravity of the offense with the exclusion of evidence more likely to result where the offense
is a minor one.
100 Friendly, supra note 20, at 953.
"'1 See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
102403 U.S. 443 (1971).
"o This is Justice Stewart's description in his opinion for the Court. See id. at 445.
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later the same day the car was towed to the police station. A search and
vacuuming of the car took place two days later and on two additional occa-
sions prior to defendant's trial. A search of the automobile had been author-
ized by a warrant issued by the state attorney general, acting as a justice of
the peace, who had taken charge of the investigation in this case and who
later served as chief prosecutor in the case. At the trial vacuum sweepings,
including particles of gun powder taken from the automobile, were admitted
in evidence against the defendant. Assuming validity of the defendant's arrest,
a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the seizure of the
automobile and the subsequent searches thereof were violative of the fourth
amendment, and, thus, the vacuum sweepings were inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule."'
One member of the majority was Justice Harlan, who wrote a special con-
curring opinion in the case to express his belief that the Court must even-
tually "face up to the basic constitutional mistakes"'' 5 of the Mapp decision."00
Had the fourth amendment never been made applicable to state cases, Harlan
would have had "little difficulty in voting to sustain this conviction."" He
expressed sympathy with law enforcement officers and the great sense of
frustration they must feel over a state of the law which makes it so uncertain
when evidence of a heinous crime may be seized in connection with a valid
arrest. "The law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling," he declared,
and suggested that such a reevaluation should begin by overruling the Mapp
case. 
08
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Black reiterated his
view that the fourth amendment alone cannot be taken as requiring the ex-
clusion of evidence secured through an unlawful search and seizure: "That
Amendment did not when adopted, and does not now, contain any constitu-
tional rule barring the admission of illegally seized evidence." '' Black be-
'"The Court held that in this case the New Hampshire Attorney General failed to meet
the fourth amendment requirement of a "neutral and detached magistrate," and accordingly
the warrant for search of the automobile was invalid. See id. at 449, citing Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Then, assuming validity of the arrest, the Court concluded the
seizure of the car in the driveway was not incident to the arrest of the defendant inside the
house, nor was it justified as being a seizure of evidence in plain view. 403 U.S. at 456,
464-72. Finally, distinguishing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court found
no "exigent circumstances" to bring the case within the special exception governing auto-
mobile searches. 403 U.S. at 458-64. In Chambers the car was stopped on the open highway,
there was probable cause to search it, and a failure to search might have resulted in loss
of the evidence because of the mobility of the vehicle. Since an initial intrusion was justified
in Chambers, the Court saw no difference between an immediate search on the highway and
seizure of the automobile with a subsequent search at the police station. In Coolidge, how-
ever, the car was immobile at the time of arrest. The Court found it "abundantly clear that
there is a significant constitutional difference between stopping, seizing and searching a car
on the open highway, and entering private property to seize and search an unoccupied,
parked vehicle not then being used for any illegal purpose." Id. at 463 n.20. In other words,
in Coolidge there was no justification for an initial search of the automobile without a war-
rant, and thus the subsequent search at the police station was invalid.
105 403 U.S. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring).
'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107403 U.S. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring).
'"8Harlan would at the same time overrule Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963),
and naturally so, since Ker established that the federal constitutional standard would thence-
forth be used for determining the reasonableness of state as well as federal searches and
seizures.
101403 U.S. at 497 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
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lieved that if evidence was to be excluded at all, "it must be under the Fifth
Amendment, not the Fourth." 10 The fifth amendment, of course, is clearly
couched in exclusionary terms-prohibiting an individual from being "com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself""'-but Black
always read this language as though it actually provided that no person
could be compelled to "give evidence against himself."'.. Thus, his fifth
amendment exclusionary rule would apparently bar use of any evidence se-
cured by compelling the defendant to participate in some way in producing
that evidence."' This would cover the evidence in the Mapp case"1 ' and in
many of the cases involving what a majority of the Supreme Court has
termed "non-testimonial" evidence.' However, under this view the evidence
in Coolidge would clearly be admissible, since the defendant was compelled
to do nothing in connection with the police officers' seizure of the automo-
bile."" Regardless of the scope of Black's fifth amendment exclusionary rule,
it is perfectly clear from his Coolidge dissent that the ever-widening scope
of the fourth amendment to cover such law enforcement tactics as electronic
surveillance,"" and the narrowing of the scope of searches incident to a valid
arrest,"" convinced him that the time had come to oppose more vigorously
the indiscriminate exclusion of all illegally seized evidence.11'
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice Black's view "that the Fourth
Amendment supports no exclusionary rule,"' which could be interpreted
as a flat rejection of the rule by Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger also agreed
that the fourth amendment does not require the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence, and he specifically rejected the idea that such evidence could be
properly excluded under the fifth amendment."' To the Chief Justice, the result
in Coolidge was a graphic illustration of "the monstrous price we pay for
the Exclusionary Rule."'
'
"' Id. at 498.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
"'403 U.S. at 498 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
11 Black did recognize that "people are obliged to yield to a proper exercise of author-
ity" under the fourth amendment. See id. (emphasis added).
14 In that case police either pried open a screen to make their entry or broke a glass in
the front door in order to open the door. After entering the house they waved a sheet of
paper at Miss Mapp and falsely told her it was a search warrant. She grabbed the paper
and tucked it into her bosom. In the scuffle which ensued the paper was recovered by the
officers, who then handcuffed Miss Mapp and forced her to accompany them on their thor-
ough search of her house. See 367 U.S. at 644-45. In addition to the compelling influences
here, the seized articles were private books and other printed matter alleged to be "lewd and
lascivious books, pictures and photographs." Id. at 643. Thus, the Mapp case, for Justice
Black, was better decided by reference to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See
Black's discussion of Boyd in his Mapp concurring opinion, 367 U.S. at 662, 663; and again
in Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 497.
111 See note 85 supra.
11. Black further found that the seizure of the car in Coolidge was reasonable and, thus,
concluded: "The evidence ...violated neither the Fifth Amendment which does contain
an exclusionary rule, nor the Fourth Amendment which does not." 403 U.S. at 510.
"'See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
"'See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also note 31 supra, and accom-
panying text, concerning the Supreme Court's seesaw approach in cases on this problem.
"'See 403 U.S. at 499-500 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
21Id. at 510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 492-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
222 Id. at 493,
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Bivens v, Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.1" The
Bivens case arose as the result of a thorough search by federal narcotics agents
of petitioner's apartment in connection with a presumably illegal arrest on
suspicion of narcotics violations. Seeking $15,000 damages, petitioner brought
suit against the federal officers in a federal district court, only to have his
complaint dismissed for failing to state a cause of action."' This ruling was
affirmed by the court of appeals,'" but the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held that "petitioner's com-
plaint states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment" entitling him
"to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the
agents' violation of the Amendment. '"" Thus, while there is no statutory
authority for such a civil cause of action against federal officers, as exists with
regard to state officials acting "under color of law,""' the Bivens case has in
effect created a cause of action under authority of the fourth amendment.
Chief Justice Burger," 8 like Justices Black'" and Blackmun,' felt that the
Court had undertaken an essentially legislative role in this case,' but he
emphasized the significance of the Court's action in relation to the exclusion-
ary rule or, as Burger often prefers, the "Suppression Doctrine." The ineffec-
tiveness of the rule, proclaimed Burger, is "illustrated by the paradox that an
unlawful act against a totally innocent person-such as petitioner claims to
be-has been left without an effective remedy, and hence the Court finds it
necessary now, 55 years later, to construct a remedy of its own.""' Thus, while
disagreeing with the Court's assumption of authority to fill this gap, Burger
saw the Bivens decision as bald recognition of the fact that the exclusionary
rule "has neither deterred deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment nor
decreased those errors in judgment that will inevitably occur given the pres-
sures inherent in police work having to do with serious crimes."'" Handling
the latter type of situations in exactly the same fashion as gross abuse of
authority especially troubled the Chief Justice. It was in this regard that he
made the statement, quoted earlier in this Article, comparing the rigidity of
the exclusionary rule to a "police order authorizing 'shoot-to kill' with respect
to every fugitive."'' Just as we have a right to expect that police response
to an escaping fugitive will be reasonably related to "the gravity and need,"
so also, said Burger, may we properly expect that the courts will react to vio-
lations of constitutional rights with "rationally graded responses."'" This in-
12403 U.S. 388 (1971).
" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp.
12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718
(2d Cir. 1969).
'2403 U.S. at 397.
12742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
12See 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
...See id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting).
'"See id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1"1 "Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence
for that task-as we do not." Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"lid. at 415-16.
"Id. at 418.
'"Id. at 419. See also note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
"' 403 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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flexibility of the rule, together with the absence of empirical evidence showing
deterrence of illegal police conduct, convinced Burger that the rule cannot
be justified "in view of the high price it extracts from society-the release
of countless guilty criminals."'" Nevertheless, the Chief Justice was unwilling
in Bivens to reject the rule outright in the absence of "some meaningful al-
ternative."''  Unfortunately, he noted, we have grown to rely on the rule as
"the exclusive remedy for unlawful official conduct," so that our position may
very well be much like the "narcotics addict whose dependence on drugs pre-
cludes any drastic or immediate withdrawal of the supposed prop, regardless
of how futile its continued use may be."'" Despite the failure of the exclu-
sionary rule to accomplish its objective of deterrence, a sudden and total
abandonment without providing any substitute remedy, might give the er-
roneous impression "that all constitutional restraints on police had somehow
been removed-that an open season on 'criminals' had been declared."'' 9 Pend-
ing action by the Congress and/or the states4' to develop "reasonable and
effective substitutes,"'41 such as Burger's own proposal for a new civil action
against the government,'" the Chief Justice appealed in Bivens only for a re-
examination of "the scope" of the rule with a view toward "at least some
narrowing of its thrust."'" Presumably this would involve an effort by the
courts to develop a "rationally graded response" to fourth amendment viola-
tions, giving due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and to the
question of whether it reflected a malicious and callous disregard for consti-
tutional rights or was an understandable and honest error of judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
With an important new empirical study supporting the assertion that the
exclusionary rule has failed to provide significant deterrence of fourth amend-
ment violations, opponents of the rule will now be pressing with renewed
enthusiasm for total rejection of the rule by the Supreme Court. On the
Court itself, as has been demonstrated, four justices expressed in the Bivens
and Coolidge cases a willingness either to abandon the rule entirely or to
make substantial inroads on its application. Depending significantly upon fu-
ture appointments to the Court,'" the most likely prospect appears to be a re-
evaluation and, perhaps, a gradual withdrawal of the exclusionary rule from
search and seizure cases. Initially, the Court could adopt a balancing approach
301/d. at 416.
,3, Id. at 420.
"3
8 Id. at 421.
139 Id.
140 "Once the constitutional validity of such a statute is established, it can reasonably be
assumed that the States would develop their own remedial systems on the federal model.
Indeed there is nothing to prevent a State from enacting a comparable statutory scheme
without waiting for the Congress." Id. at 423-24.
141 id. at 421.
142 See note 61 supra, and accompanying text.
,1 403 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
'"The departure from the Court of Justices Black and Harlan left only two members
(Burger and Blackmun) who have specifically voiced opposition to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. Speculating that the President's new appointees hold views which are sub-
stantially in accord with those of the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, opposition to the
rule on the Court probably may be expected to increase.
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similar to that proposed by the American Law Institute" and by Chief Justice
Burger in his Bivens dissent. This would result in a narrowing of the rule's
application and would provide a suitable transition to complete rejection of
the rule. During this transition period, new vehicles for handling fourth
amendment violations" M could be developed and tested in practice. Assuming
success with the new enforcement methods, it would appear that the Supreme
Court might very likely be willing to discard the exclusionary rule in fourth
amendment cases entirely.14
Developments along the lines discussed above would be welcome relief
indeed from the present blunderbuss approach to fourth amendment violations.
In the carefully reasoned words of Chief Justice Burger:
Instead of continuing to enforce the Suppression Doctrine, inflexibly, rigidly,
and mechanically, we should view it as one of the experimental steps in the
great tradition of the Common Law and acknowledge its shortcomings. But in
the same spirit we should be prepared to discontinue what the experience of
over half a century has shown neither deters errant officers nor affords a remedy
to the totally innocent victims of official misconduct.'"
"45 See notes 90-101 supra, and accompanying text.
" See the discussion of potential alternatives in notes 42-62 supra, and accompanying
text.
14 It is possible that the Court might be eventually willing to reject the rule as a con-
stitutional requirement but, exercising its supervisory powers over the federal courts, insist
upon retaining it in federal cases.
"" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
420 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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